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WHENTHECOURTHASAPARTY,HOW
MANY "FRIENDS" SHOW UP?
A NOTE ON THE STATISTICAL
DISTRIBUTION OF AMICUS BRIEF FILINGS

DANIEL A. FARBER*

I. INTRODUCTION

Amicus briefs have been a significant subject of empirical
research. 1 Researchers have also used the number of amicus
briefs filed in a case as a measure of the case's importance. 2
Lawyers also have reason to be interested in amicus briefs,
which have gone from being exceptional to being the norm in
Supreme Court cases. 3 This study addresses some basic questions about amicus filings: what is the distribution of this measure of case importance? How does it relate to other measures of
importance such as a case's citation rates?
Because this study is an outgrowth of a previous one, 4 it
may be helpful to begin with a summary of the previous re-

Sho Sa to Professor of Law. University of California. Berkeley.
See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill. The Influence of Amiws
Curiae Brief\· on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000); Lee Epstein, Interest
Group Litigation During the Rehnqui.1t Court Era. 9 J. L. & Pol. 639 (1993); Donald R.
Songer and Reginald S. Sheehan. Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amiws Participation in the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339 (1993).
2. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 62-63 (2006)(using amicus filings as a measure of political
salience); FORREST MALTZMAN. JAMES F. SPRIGGS II. & PAUL J. WAHLBECK,
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000): Timothy R.
Johnson, James F. Spriggs II. and Pual J. Wahlbeck. Passing and Strategic Voting on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 39 LAW. & SoC'Y. REV. 349. 363 (2005).
3. Epstein. supra note 1, at 645 (graph showing that since the end of the Warren
Court era, the proportion of cases with amicus briefs has roughly doubled).
4. Daniel A. Farber. Earthquakes and Tremors in Statlllory Interpretation: An
Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848 (2005).
1.
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search. In that study, using citation data for the Supreme Court's
1984 and 1990 Terms, I examined patterns of citation frequency
in order to test three models:
• Under the first model, the extent of an opinion's contribution to the law (and thereby its influence) is determined by a host of independent factors. This model produces a bell-shaped distribution of "step lengths," ranging
from baby to giant steps. The data did not support this
model.
• Under the second model, judges have bounded rationality and strong attachments to existing rules, leading them
to take "baby steps" most of the time but occasional "giant steps" when continued adherence to an existing norm
proves untenable. In empirical studies by various social
scientists, this kind of model has been found to produce
frequency distributions that are roughly normal but have
a characteristic known as "leptokurtosis." The data also
failed to support this model: the degree of leptokurtosis
was much too high, so that the curves were far from the
normal distribution.
• The third model stems from complexity theory (also
known as chaos theory or fractal geometry.) This type of
model applies to many dynamic processes-for example,
it fits the frequency distribution of earthquakes. This
model was supported by the data, explaining most of the
2
variance in the data (with R over .80 for both of the
Terms I studied) 5
The current study tests these models (along with one additional
one) in the context of amicus brief filings.
During the earlier study I became intrigued by the apparent
divergences between the number of times a case was cited in
later court rulings versus other citations (primarily law reviews).
A regression analysis 6 showed that my impression was correct.
Although an increase in the number of case citations did predict
5. hi. at ~liS. ~li7. The findings were consistent with an earlier study. David G. Post
and Michael B. Eisen. How Long is the Coastline of the Law~ Thoughts on the Fracwra/
Nawre of Legal Systems. 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000).
li. For readers who are unfamiliar with regression analysis. the Russell Sage Foundation has published several helpful handbooks for social science students in its series
·'Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences." See MICHAEL LEWIS-BECK. APPLIED
REGRESSIOt': A:--1 [:--ITRODUCTION (19~0): CHRISTOPHER ACHEN. INTERPRETING ASD
USING REGRESSIOI' (19~2): LARRY SCHROEDER. DAVID SJODQUIST. & PAULA STEPHAN.
U:--IDERSTAI'DING REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE (19~li).
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a higher average number of noncase citations, almost none of
2
7
the variance was explained (with an R of only .07). When I divided the ten most heavily cited cases into two groups, based on
the proportion of judicial versus non-judicial citations, the difference between the groups was striking. Of the five cases most
frequently cited by courts, all but one dealt with a procedural issue, and the exception dealt with ERISA preemption. 8 The five
cases most frequently cited in law reviewers involved more socially salient issues such as discrimination. 9 In short, the courts
seemed most keenly interested in procedure, while the commentators were drawn to cases with quasi-constitutional overtones. 10
The two primary results of the current study regarding the
frequency distribution of amicus briefs are as follows. First, a
power law distribution does provide improved fit (over linear
regression), but less strikingly than for citation frequencies. An
exponential distribution is a slightly better fit and might well be
preferred. Both distributions leave significant unexplained variance. The broader implication is that the number of briefs filed
in a case probably depends on a fairly complex set of frictions
and feedback loops. It is plausible to assume that the same
probably holds true of other types of efforts to influence government decisionmakers (i.e., lobbying).
Second, amicus brief filings are unrelated to the number of
federal appellate citations received by an opinion, but are mod-

7. Although weak, the positive relationship was genuine. The X coefficient was
significant at the 2.5% level.
H. The five cases were FMC Corp v. Holliday. 49H U.S. 52 (1990) (ERISA preemption): Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 49H U.S. 89 (1990) (statute of limitations in Title
VII case against federal government); Grogan v. Garner, 49H U.S. 279(1991) (burden of
proof in certain bankruptcy procedures) (the most highly cited statutory case of the
Term!); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (habeas procedure); Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute. 499 U.S. 5H5 (1991) (whether a forum selection clause violated a
maritime statute).
9. The five cases were EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)
(application of Title VII on foreign soil); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500
U.S. 20 (1991) (enforceability of agreement to arbitrate discrimination claim): Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (abortion counseling restriction); Feist Publications. Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (application of statutory and constitutional requirements of originality in copyright case); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991) (implications of state sovereignty for interpretation of civil rights law).
10. In this study, rather than using total judicial citations. I studied appellate citations, so the results are not directly comparable. In fact. it turns out that appellate citations have a greater correlation with law review citations, at least in this sample (R' =
.49). It also appears that amicus brief filings are an indicator of how often the Supreme
Court itself will later cite a decision. See JAMES H. FOWLER ET AL., NETWORK ANALYSIS
AND THE LAW: MEASURING THE LEGAL IMPORTANCE OF SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENTS 35 (2006) (on file with author).
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estly related to the number of law review citations. We should be
cautious about using any one of these measures as the sole gauge
of an opinion's importance. There seem to be distinct dimensions of case importance, an issue that deserves further investigation in its own right.
I. POSSIBLE MODELS

We do not have a systematic understanding of the process
that leads to the filing of amicus briefs. 11 A 1993 study revealed
several important factors. First, many amici are repeat players. 12
Second, surveys of amici suggest that the most important factor
is the perceived relevance of the case to the organization's goals,
followed by the quality of the case as a legal vehicle. 13 Third, filing an amicus brief is costly - ranging from $8,000 to about
$20,000. The average organization surveyed had an interest in
about sixteen cases; for half the organizations, participating in
that number of cases would have exceeded the organization's entire litigation budget. 14 Fourth, economic interest groups filed an
increasing share of the amicus briefs. 15
We also know that individual organizations do not make filing decisions in a vacuum. State governments have formed a
network that results in concerted filing activities:
During the 1990 Term, for example, in cases in which at least
one state filed a friend-of-the-court brief, the average number
of other states participating was 15.7. In only three cases did a
state participate as amicus curiae without the support of oth16
ers.

Or consider the following advice to lawyers with cases before the
Supreme Court: "[i]n today's world, effective representation of
11. This paper focuses on amicus briefs that are filed on the merits of the case. Fil·
ing at the cert. stage seems to be less frequent but is strongly associated with the Court's
likelihood of taking the case. See Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Organized
/meresls and Agenda Selling in /he U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109
(19gg).
12.

Epstein. supra note 3, at 660. Experienced lawyers tend to have more success
before the Court. See Kevin T. McGuire, Repeal Players in the Supreme Court: The Role
o( Experienced Lawyers in Litigalion Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (2001 ). Kearney and Merrill.
supra note 1. at 749. report a similar finding for amicus briefs.
13. Epstein. supra note 1. at 660.
14. /d.at661.
15. /d. at 680.
Hi. Epstein. supra note 1. at 671. Note. however. that the "participation" of other
states does not necessarily track the number of amicus briefs: they may simply join as
additional amici on a brief rather than fihng their own.
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your client requires that you at least seriously explore the possibility of enlisting persuasive amicus support on your client's behalf."17
One obvious motive for filing an amicus brief is to influence
the result in a case. It is unclear how effective briefs actually are
in this regard, particularly if we exclude those filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the United States. The authors of the
most recent and thorough empirical study report that "amicus
briefs supporting respondents enjoy higher success rates than do
amicus briefs supporting petitioners; that small disparities of one
or two briefs for one side with no briefs on the other side may
translate into higher success rates but larger disparities do
not .... " 18 Notably, the number of cases filed tends to be similar
on both sides of the case. 19 A final relevant fact: the Court itself
does not serve a gatekeeper function; it routinely approves filing
of briefs in cases where the parties themselves fail to consent.
In the absence of a strong theory for predicting filing, we
may turn to more general models as a source of guidance. One
possibility is that the number of amicus briefs filed in a given
case is more or less random-that is, that it is the product of unrelated factors operating in different directions, which happen to
balance out one way or another in a particular case. Trying to
identify and measure these various factors would be difficult.
But, it turns out, we may be able to identify this kind of randomness without specifying the causal links. A basic theorem of
mathematical statistics links this form of randomness with the
famous bell-shaped, normal distribution. More precisely, the
central limit theorem states that "the sum of a large number of
independent random variables will be approximately normally
distributed almost regardless of their individual distributions;
any random variable which can be regarded as the sum of a large
number of small, independent contributions is thus likely to follow the normal distribution approximately." 20

Bruce J. Ennis, Symposium on Supreme Cour/ Advocacy: Effective Amicu.1·
33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1'184). Similarly, Judge Posner remarks that the "vast
majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the arguments
made in the litigants' briefs." Rayan v. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n, 125 F.3d
1062. 1063 (7th Cir. 1'!'!7). A 111'17 review requires disclosure of whether counsel for a
party authored any part of an amicus brief and also requires disclosure of financial contributions toward producing the brief. Kearney and Merrill. supra note 1. at 766.
18. Kearney and Merrill. supra note 1, at 74'1.
111. /d. at 822. The authors suggest that there may be a kind of arms race, in which
amici file simply to counter filings on the other side. ld. at 821.
20. M.G. BULMER. PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 109 (2d ed. 1967, 1979 corrected re17.

Brief~.
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We could not expect an exact correspondence between citation data and the normal distribution, if only because the normal
distribution requires an infinite domain in both directions while
the number of citations to an opinion cannot be a negative number. In assessing deviations from normality, a few parameters are
especially useful. For later reference, here is a list:
Central
The mean, the median, and the mode of a
Tendency
normal distribution ::tre the same.
Skew

A normal curve is symmetrical rather than
being skewed in either direction. Symmetry
is measured by the skew parameter, which is
zero for the normal distribution.

Kurtosis

Kurtosis measures whether a curve is flattened out or unusually peaked, compared
with the normal distribution. Kurtosis for
the normal distribution is sometimes given
as 3. 21 However, my software used a different formula, for which the normal distribution comes out at zero.
Leptokurtosis in data has an important implication for decisionmaking.22 Change data from human institutions have, in
comparison to the Gaussian (normal) distribution, an excess of
cases in the central peak, an excess of cases in the tails of the distribution, but a paucity of cases in the "shoulders," the area between the central peak and the tails. In terms of amicus briefs,
the idea would be that most briefs get some average amount of
attention from interested groups that results in filings, but there
may be a tendency for attention to snowball once a case begins
getting attention. The snowballing effect can lead to distribution
tails that follow the third model (discussed below).
Another variant of the second model leads to an exponential distribution. In this model, cognitive and institutional factors
function only as a source of friction, essentially impeding the reaction of decisionmakers to relevant information. 23 The hy-

print). For a sketch of one proof. see id. at 115-16.
21. See id. at 61-65. 111.
22. The literature is surveyed in Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner. A
Model of Choice j(Jr Puhlic: Polic:y. 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 325 (2005).
23. Bryan D. Jones, Frank R. Baumgartner, Christian Breunig et al.. Are Poliliwl
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pothesis is that the number of cases with N + 1 amicus briefs is a
fixed fraction of the number of cases with N briefs. This results
in a distribution having the form y = be"' . Apart from friction,
this might also reflect a diffusion process. For example, there
could be a core group whose members tend to be the first to decide to file in a case, information leaks out from this group to a
larger group whose members then must decide to file; if they do,
the information then leaks out to another group.
The third model entered the law review literature in an innovative study of judicial citations by David Post and Michael
24
Eisen. They speculated that law may have the same branching
properties that generate certain fractal geometric objects, because each legal issue can potentiall~ sprout sub-issues, which in
turn can sprout sub-sub-issues, etc. 5 Post and Eisen explained
how such fractal branching is associated with power law distributions, in which frequency varies as some power n of a basic parameter. Such distributions are "produced at the boundary between order and disorder, at the 'edge of chaos."' 26 Power law
distributions are "well nigh ubiquitous in a wide variety of physical, biological, and social systems. " 27 Post and Eisen cited examples involving meteorology, demographics, biodiversity, and
medicine-as well as the example I have chosen as emblematic,
earthquake sizes. 28 Based on a very large sample of New York
Court of Appeals cases and another sample of Seventh Circuit
decisions, they find a good fit with their hypothesized power law
(especially for the New York data). 29

Systems Poised between the "Order'" oF Friction and the "Chaos" of Urgency? Public
Budgeting in Comparative Perspecth·e. http://www.policyagendas.org/pdf!BudgetsAre
Paretian2.pdf (October 2006).
24. Post and Eisen. supra note 5.
25. !d. at 553-5'1.
26. ld at 56S.
27. !d. at 56'1.
2S. !d. at 56'1 n.56'1. For other examples. see Pablo Marquet. Of Predator.\·, Prey,
and Power Laws, 2'15 SCIENCE 2229 (2002) (referring to the "vast number of biological
power laws"): Thomas Bak. Power-Law Distributions and the Federal Judiciary. 46
JURISMETRICS 139 (Winter 2006) (number of court filings per district follow power law
distributions).
2'1. Post & Eisen supra note 5. at 571-S3.
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II. DATA ANALYSIS
I randomly chose a Term between the Rehnquist-era Term
in my first study and Rehnquist's departure from the Court. 30
The term selected was the 1997 Term. In addition to Rehnquist,
the Court consisted of Justices Stevens , O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter. Table 1 gives some
statistics about the the individual Justices and their cases.
Table 1
Characteristics of Assigned Cases

Justice
Stevens
O'Connor
Scalia
Thomas
Kennedy
Ginsburg
Breyer
Souter
Rehnquist

Average amicus
briefs
per assigned case

Average total
number
cites per
assigned case

4
7
5
7
5
3
2
4
6

326
365
682
219
707
184
522
661
524

These figures suggest some interesting patterns. The four
most conservative Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy) averaged 5.75 amicus briefs per assigned case, compared
with 7.0 for Justice O'Connor (the Court's swing voter), and 3.25
for the Court's remaining, more liberal Justices. This suggests
the possibility that having a high number of amicus briefs is correlated with the tendency of the Chief Justice to assign cases to
allies or swing voters he wishes to cultivate. 31

30. The reason for considering only later Terms was simply to make the study more
current.
31. Conservatives also had somewhat more total cites per opinion (an average of
533) than liberals (averaging 423). This supports the idea that citation counts do indeed
relate to a case's significance. assuming that the Chief Justice assigns the most significant
opinions to his allies. One could improve on this result by separating out those cases
where the Chief was in the minority. so the assignment would be made by the senior Jus-
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Figure 1
Amicus Brief Frequency
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The situation becomes more interesting when we look at the
overall distribution of amicus briefs, which is illustrated in Figure
1. Figure 1 looks nothing like a normal distribution. As table 2
demonstrates, this visual impression is correct: the distribution
has significant leptokurtosis and skew. But the statistics are less
useful in distinguishing between the remaining three models.
The kurtosis and skew seem low enough to be consistent with
the bounded rationality assumptions of model 2. Since model 2
has been successfully used elsewhere to denote the attention
given agenda items, it might well fit here.

tice in the majority (probably Stevens in those cases).
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Table 2
Distribution of Amicus Briefs per Case
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

4.758241758
0.474332809
3
1
4.524846613
20.47423687
1.319868246
1.199535843
22
0
22
433
91

I then did a series of regressions to extract further information from the data. I first ran a linear regression of the number of
cases with a given number of amicus briefs against that number
2
(i.e., frequency against number of briefs per case). The R was a
respectable .51, meaning that about half the variance in the frequency was explained. I then regressed the log of the frequency
2
against the number of amicus briefs, improving the R to .71.
This provided some support for the exponential model. Finally, I
regressed the log of the number of briefs against the log of the
2
frequency, with comparable results (a slightly lower R of .68).
On the whole, this data for amicus briefs does not fit the
power law model that seems to apply generally to citations. We
can think of the exponential model and power law model as being in a sense sequential: first we take the log of one variable and
see how much explanatory power we gain (the exponential
model) and then we also take the log of the other variable (the
power law variable ). 32 Geometrically, we are squeezing the linear graph first along the y-axis and then along the x-axis. It turns

32. I should mention a small technical problem: the cases that had zero briefs. The
logarithm of zero is undefined. I tried two different ways of dealing with this problem.
The first was to add one to the number of briefs and then take logs. It occurred to me
that this could cause distortions, so I also tried doing the regression while excluding the
cases that had no amicus briefs. The differences in results between the two approaches
were not significant.

WHEN THE COURT HAS A PARTY
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out that there's a substantial increase of explanatory power in
2
the first stop (with R rising by .2) but then a slight loss with the
2
second stop (with R declining by .03). Thus, the distinctive geometric feature of the power law seems irrelevant.
The inappropriateness of the power law model is also suggested by comparing the distribution of amicus briefs with the
characteristics of the distribution of citations. Figure 2 shows the
frequency distribution for "total citations" for the 1997 Term.
Figure 2
Total Citations Per Case

60 50 -'-
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This figure starts with a very high peak, drops off very quickly,
but then has a very long right tail that drops off very slowly. As
shown in Table 3 descriptive statistics for the total citations were
also quite different from those for the amicus briefs, with much
higher skew and kurtosis.
Table 3
Distribution of Total Citations Per Case
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count

469.307692
72.8371973
235
223
694.822578
482778.415
8.92234187
2.95104786
3629
15
3644
42707
91

The upshot is that Model 2 (friction and diffusion) looks the
strongest for amicus filings, although Model 3 cannot be definitely rejected. In the hope of getting a better grasp on the situation, I ran an additional series of regressions of the number of
amicus briefs in a case versus various citation counts for that
case. There's no reason to expect a linear relationship here, so
instead of using the raw scores, I regressed the ranks of the
numbers (that is, a case might be counted as being 30th in terms
of number of amicus briefs, 20th in number of law review cites,
etc.)
The results were intriguing. Ranking in terms of appellate
cites was essentially unrelated to ranking in terms of number of
amicus briefs (R 2 = .03, so almost none of the variance was explained, and the x coefficient was .2, meaning that moving up
33
one rank produced an average increase of only .2 ranks.) Thus,

33. Given this result. it is no surprise that amicus brief rank was also weakly related
to total cites. with an R' of .12 and an x coefficient of .39.)
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the number of amicus briefs filed in a case predicts very little
about the case's total number of citations.
The regressions using law review citations were more noteworthy. When regressing law review citation rank against amicus
rank, the R 2 was .299 (meaning almost a third of the variance
was explained) and the x coefficient was .6 (meaning that moving up one rank in the amicus brief ranking caused an average
move of .6 up in the law review citation ranking). As a check, I
decided to go ahead and do a linear regression of the absolute
numbers (number of amicus filings in a case versus number of
2
law review cites for the case. The R sank to .16 (so the relationship apparently is not very linear after all). Nevertheless, the x
coefficient was 16.3, significant at well below the .001 level,
meaning that adding one amicus brief results in roughly sixteen
additional law review cites.
My prior study suggested that law review citations were often connected with measures of societal relevance, as opposed to
the more procedural issues that tend to provoke attention the
most often from appellate courts. The relationship between
amicus filings and law review citations provides some supporting
evidence. It also suggests, however, that amicus filings also involve important factors that are unrelated to the factors which
legal academics find significant about a judicial decision.
III. INTERPRETING THE DATA
Beyond the statistical data, an examination of some individual cases may help round out the picture. Table 4 lists the six
cases with the highest number of amicus briefs, along with their
other characteristics.

32
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Table 4
Cases with the Most Amicus Briefs
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O'Connor

522 U.S. 3

Kennedy

523 u.s.
666

Thomas

524 U.S
.103

Ginsbur~

523 u.s.
360

Rehnquist

Rehnquist

w..~W-1

VJ2

oi
Stare Oil Co. v.
Khan
Arkansas £due.
Television
Com'n v.
Forhes
Cass Cormry,
Minn. v. Leec;h
Lake Band of
Chippewa
Indians

r/)r/)

:JLJ...

UW-1

~;:;:
~co

~(/)

~W-1

~t-

ou
ti:t)

>
W-IVJ
~L.Ll

~t
~u

.....lr/)

~W-1

t-tot-U

.....l

13

236

313

549

15

132

316

448

15

15

43

58

13

26

38

64

524 U.S.
156

Unired Srales v.
U.S. Shoe Corp.
Phillips v.
Washing11!1l
Legal
Foundation

22

81

221

302

522 U.S.
136

General £lee.
Co. v. Joiner

14

979

612

1591

Briefly, here is what the cases were about and a description
of the amici:
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation 34 was a challenge
to state financing for legal aid. The specific claim is that the diversion of interest from lawyers' client accounts to finance the
program was a taking. 35 The Court upheld the claim but there
was a remand to determine the amount of compensation, if any.
The amici were public interest groups (conservative and liberal),
state governments, and representatives of the bench and bar.
Notably, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief.
Arkansas Educ. Television Com'n v. Forbes 36 was a First
Amendment case, in which a third-party candidate complained
that a public T.V. station had excluded him from a candidates'
34. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
JS. An additional wrinkle is that under federal law. neither the lawyers nor the clients could themselves earn interest on accounts of this type. To my mind, this makes the
takings claim far-fetched. but a majority of the Justices obviously took a different view.
36 523 U.S. n66 (1998).
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debate it was broadcasting. He lost. Some amici were public interests groups like the ACLU; most were government organizations (including the FCC) or broadcasters.
Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians37 involved the claimed immunity of certain Indian reservation lands from state taxation. Nearly all the amici were, not surprisingly, either Indian tribes or state and local governments.
United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp. 38 involved the constitutionality of a harbor maintenance tax under the Export-Import
Clause, as obscure a constitutional issue as one can imagine.
Nearly all the amici were from shipping interests. The tax was
struck down.
State Oil Co. v. Khan 39 was a notable antitrust case. Overruling precedent, the Court held that a maximum price term in a
franchise contract was not per se illegal. The United States filed
on one side; thirty-three states filed on the other. There were
other non-aligned filers, and a few briefs were filed by franchisee
representatives. The large majority of the briefs, however, were
filed by firms or trade associations on the franchisor side of the
case.
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner 40 involved the trial judge's power
to exclude "unreliable" expert testimony, a matter of great importance to the torts bar. Amici included trial lawers' associations, the United States, representatives of the medical profession like the AMA, and a few public interest groups, but many
represented industry interests. The Chamber of Commerce and
National Association of Manufacturers filed, as well as trade associations and members of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries. In line with the observation in my previous paper, this
procedural case was the only one to receive a large number of
citations by courts.
Perhaps the most obvious finding is that amicus filings tend
to come in clumps. There is the "relevant industry" clump, the
"public interest" clump, and the governmental clump. In part,
this may simply be a matter of whose interests are affected - the
universe of interests affected directly by Supreme Court opinions may be quite lumpy. It may also represent, however, the
operation of networks among certain groups or their lawyers,
37.
38.
39.
40.

524 u.s. 103 (1998).
523 u.s. 360 (1998).
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
522 u.s. 136 (1997).
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which could either operate through a concerted effort or merely
by diffusing information. Whatever its cause, this clumping apparently does not have any relationship to how often cases are
cited by lower courts. The three cases that got significant law review attention were on subjects commonly encountered by law
students and relatively popular with law reviews: constitutional
law, evidence, and antitrust. 41
For comparison purposes, I then took a look at the cases in
which only one amicus brief had been filed. The amici in those
cases included the ACLU, the United States (twice), the Commissioner of Social Security, one state and one group of twentytwo states, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (four times), a foundation devoted to sentencing reform,
and the car manufacturer's trade association (once). In strong
contrast to the top five cases, where industry filings were frequent and tended to come in clusters, industry took little interest
in these cases.
Whether an entity files an amicus brief depends on attention (do organizational decisionmakers take notice of a case?)
and interests (does the benefit of filing outweigh the cost?). The
two are interrelated, since organizations presumably are more
likely to pay attention to cases that affect their interests strongly.
There also seem to be a somewhat limited universe of potential
filers, consisting of major business entities and associations, legal
organizations, governments (particularly the United States); and
public interest associations. The interests of other groups - such
as criminal defendants and crime victims, consumers, taxpayers,
non-unionized workers, and the general public- are represented
only to the extent that one of these large organizations chooses
to do so. Many of these organizations have overlapping interests,
so attention may be an important factor in determining which
ones participate.
One might expect that there might be a damping effect, that
is, that if an entity is aware that other briefs will be filed, there is
less marginal benefit from adding its own brief. This does not
seem evident from the data. For example, the presence of other
briefs from of chemical and pharmaceutical companies in Joiner
did not seem to deter additional filings, although it seems doubtful that the additional briefs added anything of great substance.

41.

The average number of law review cites for all 1997 Term cases was 150.6.
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The exponential fit (suggestive of friction or diffusion
mechanisms) was slightly better than the power law fit (suggestive of positive feedback). Both fit the data fairly well, though
not as well as the power law typically fits citation data. It is possible that some combination of the two might be more successful, with friction dominating below a certain threshold and then
positive feedback taking over.
It is not difficult to imagine friction or diffusion mechanisms. The individuals who have final authority in an organization over the decision to file may have bounded rationality, using
one or two factors to make the decision. Over time, these factors
change as experience builds up about their suitability, and at any
given time, decisionmakers in different organizations may be at
different stages of this process.
Organizational issues may also present barriers to filing; the
default choice is not to file and competition for scarce funds may
make it difficult to get authorization. Outside of the universe of
frequent Supreme Court players, information about the importance of the case may spread with difficulty, affecting the likelihood that non-frequent filers will enter the game. We might
learn more about these mechanism with a statistical study focusing on filers rather than cases. In other words, it would be very
useful to investigate how many organizations file a specific number of briefs. The study would probably have to continue over
more than one Term to get a sense of the distribution at the left
end of the distribution,
Feedback mechanisms between organizations are also easy
to imagine. Filings by other organizations (either allies or opponents) may make a case more salient for decisionmakers. The attendant publicity might also attract attention from entities that
do not normally follow the Court closely, such as organizational
members, who may wonder why their organization has failed to
take part in a case when so many others have done so. Filings on
one side may lead to more opposing filings in order to avoid an
imbalance, which in turn prompt responsive filings on the first
side. On the other hand, filings by allies (especially in cases that
do not have high salience) may reduce the likelihood that an organization will file, since the case is already "covered."
As noted at the beginning of this paper, some researchers
have used amicus filings as a measure of the importance of an
opinion. The amount of feedback, negative and positive, in the
filing decision at least introduces a great deal of noise in this
measure. Moreover, it is far from clear, even apart from the
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noise, what the number of briefs tells us about the importance of
a case. Perhaps it should not be too surprising that the number
of briefs is unrelated to the number of judicial citations of a Supreme Court opinion. The cases that have the most citations are
those that are relevant in later litigation involving large numbers
of litigants; collective action problems may prevent such large
groups from mobilizing. The relationship between amicus briefs
and law review citations is stronger but still modest; at least the
two measures seem to point in the same direction. Since these
measures are (to say the least) not highly correlated, we should
think twice before relying on any single statistic as a measure of
case importance.
For those who are interested more broadly in governmental
processes, the results should also be interesting. Filing an amicus
brief is an effort to influence a government decisionmaker;
hence, a form of lobbying. Admittedly, it differs from other lobbying in its formality and more importantly, in the inability to offer the decisionmaker any benefits in return for support. Nevertheless, the results do suggest that the intensity of lobbying on
any specific issue is not a simple function of the underlying
alignment of interests, but also involves an interplay of cognitive,
institutional, and information factors. In this regard, it would be
interesting to know how the number of organizations that provide congressional testimony is distributed across bills (presumably adjusting for the size of the legislation itself).
To return to the question posed in the title: when the Supreme Court has a party (in the form of an argued case), how
many "friends" come to the event? The best we can say at this
point is that the answer depends on the case and may involve a
number of frictional forces as well as feedback effects.
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APPENDIX: DATA FOR THE 1997 TERM
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Clinton v. City of
New York

7

108

471

579

524 U.S. 184

Bryan v. U.S.

2

139

84

223

523 U.S. 574

Crawford-£! v.
Britton

4

682

144

826

523 U.S. 517

U.S. v. Estate of
Romani

0

34

58

92

Miller v. Albright

1

66

203

269

523 U.S. 135

Quality King
Distributors, Inc.
v. L'anza
Research Intern.,
Inc.

10

29

142

171

522 U.S. 252

RC?.Kers v. U.S.

0

9

7

16

Kalina v. Fletcher

6

375

60

435

Monge v.
Cali]()rnia

7

104

112

216

13

196

361

557

524

523

522

us 417

u.s. 420

u.s. 118

524 U.S. 721
524

u.s. 498

Eastern Enters. v.
A~!

42. Signed Opinions for the 1997 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court were identified
using a terms and connectors search of U.S. Supreme Court Cases which was restricted
by date (10/1997-71199H) and restricted by field (Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, etc.)
43. Amicus briefs were tabulated using information in a list of documents that appears at the end of each case in Westlaw. The number of amicus briefs for each entry was
tabulated by counting the number of westlaw documents in which "amicus" or "amici"
appeared in the description.
44. Federal Appellate Court Citations were tabulated using the "cites" tab in LexisNexis. Tabulation includes U.S. Supreme Court, 1st-11th Circuits, Federal Circuit, Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, and D.C. Circuit.
45. Law Review Citations were tabulated by using the "Unrestricted Shepard's
Summary" in LexisNexis.
46. Total was tabulated by taking the sum of Federal Appellate Court Citations and
Law Review Citations.
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11
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495

524 U.S. 274
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Dist.
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256

357

613

523 U.S. 491

California v. Deep
Sea Research, Inc.

9

49

101
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523 U.S. 213

Cohen v. de la
Cruz

1

285
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345

522 U.S. 329

South Dakota v.
Yankton Sioux
Tribe
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49

97
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Lunding v. New
York Tax Appeals
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0

7
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50

522 U.S. 156

City of Chicago v.
International
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3

458
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530
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State Oil Co. v.
Khan

13

236
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Pennsylvania
Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey
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518
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American Tel.
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Central Office
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Implement Workers of America,
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0
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523 U.S. 382
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Co. v. C.I.R.

2

23
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47

523 U.S. 296

Texas v. U.S.

2
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523 U.S. 75
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8
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Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
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Spencer v. Kemna

1
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1
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Allentown Mack
Sales and Svc.,
Inc. v. NLRB

6
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524 U.S. 742

Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
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8
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524 U.S. 624

Bragdon v. Abbatt

1
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1439

524 U.S. 308

Caron v. U.S.

0

90
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524 U.S. 236

Hahn v. U.S.

4
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Kiowa Tribe of
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v. Forbes
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3
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1
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5

127
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1
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8
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1
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Foster v. Love

0

9

37

46

524 U.S. 321
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U.S. Shoe Corp.

13

26

38

64

523 U.S. 57

Kawaauhau v.
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Edwards v. U.S.

1

208

52

260

AlmendarezTorres v. U.S.

1

2497

332

2829

Lewis v. U.S.

1

30

30

60

Gray v. Maryland

4

196

61

257

Trest v. Cain

2

140

34

174

u.s .399
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